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HE competing rights expressed in sections 1 and 2 of Canada's
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) form the foundation of
an unfolding civil liberties battle. Section 2(b) of the Charter pro-
vides qualified protection for "freedom of conscience and religion; free-
dom of thought, belief, opinion and expression."'  Section 1 of the
Charter, however, subjects these rights "to such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."'2 It is this qualifying clause that is forcing Canadian courts to
incrementally refine how section 1 of the Charter may limit individuals'
section 2 rights.
A recent addition to Canada's Federal Criminal Code section 318(4)
(section 318(4) or Legislation), 3 adding sexual orientation to the list of
classes protected against hate speech, will provide Canadian courts with
an opportunity to revisit the extent of section l's limiting power. Hate
crime laws protect specified groups of individuals who are deemed to
need increased governmental protection from speech motivated by ha-
tred.4 Because of the Legislation, statements that are disapproving of ho-
mosexual behavior are classified as hate speech and are subject to
criminal prosecution. Canadians who oppose homosexuality on religious
grounds and non-religious citizens who fear that the Legislation is overly
broad have expressed concerns that the law will infringe on their constitu-
tionally protected freedoms of religion and expression.9
*Sarah Stark is a 2005 J.D. Candidate at the Dedman School of Law, Southern
Methodist University. Prior to attending law school, the author obtained a B.A. in
history from the University of Dallas. Following graduation, she will be clerking
for United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, Judge Dee
Drell.
1. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights & Free-
doms), § 2(a), (b).
2. Id. § 1.
3. Offenses Against the Person and Reputation Hate Propaganda, R.S.C. ch. C-46,
§ 318(4) (2004) (Can.).
4. Attis v. New Brunswick Dist. No. 15 Bd. of Educ., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 868 (quot-
ing R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 336).
5. Vic Toews, Address to the Canadian Parliament (June 6, 2003), available at http://
www.victoews.com/speechl.aspID=97.
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II. CANADIAN CIVIL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
According to the Canadian Supreme Court, Charter section 2(b)'s pur-
pose "is to permit free expression to promote truth, political or social
participation, and self-fulfillment." Its purpose is to protect the minor-
ity's rights to express their views, even when unpopular.6 Minority
speech, although perhaps unpopular, is protected because someone will
always object to another's statements. 7 All expression intending to con-
vey meaning is theoretically safeguarded under section 2(b), 8 and only
violent actions are completely excluded from the Charter's protection. 9
Further, the free expression guarantee protects both the meaning at-
tempted to be conveyed and the meaning as perceived by the receiving
party. 10
The freedoms protected in Charter section 2(b) are essential to Cana-
dian democracy."I Because the enumerated freedoms are fundamental to
protect and further democracy, the Charter's authors afforded them
greater protection than other enumerated rights. For example, the provi-
sion proclaiming the right to be free from unreasonable searches 12 pro-
vides a further qualifying provision allowing that right to be limited. No
such statement is included in Charter section 2(b).
As written, with section 1 acting as a limitation on section 2, the Char-
ter forces the courts to weigh the interests of respective parties before
determining whether an imposition on civil rights is permissible. 13 Cana-
dian courts have adopted a two-step analysis to ascertain whether a gov-
ernmental action demonstrates sufficient need to override a citizen's
enumerated civil rights.1 4 Courts must first determine whether the indi-
vidual's activity is constitutionally protected.' 5 If it is protected, the ac-
tivity may be limited only by a restriction that is reasonable under
Charter section 1. Because a reasonableness standard is generally subjec-
tive, Canadian courts have adopted a three-part proportionality analysis
to determine when an imposition on rights is reasonable. 16 To prevail,
the government must show "that the measure adopted is rationally con-
nected to the objective ... ; that the measure impair as little as possible
the right or freedom in question ... ; and that there [is] proportionality
6. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 732.
7. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Bell, [1994] 21 C.R.R. (2d) 92, 26
(Sask. App. Ct.).
8. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights & Free-
doms), § 2(b).
9. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 732; see also Attis, 1 S.C.R. at 864.
10. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 733.
11. Id. at 751.
12. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights & Free-
doms), § 8 provides, "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure."
13. Id. §§ 1-2.
14. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 735 (citing R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 30).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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between the effects of the measure and the objective." 17
When examining limitations on constitutional rights, the courts pre-
sume that legislation may violate one or more constitutional provisions18
because courts fear that a restriction on constitutional rights could result
in a slippery slope that results in a permissive attitude toward section 2(b)
violations. 19 The government bears a heavy burden in showing that any
limitation is reasonable under Charter section 1. Where an express right
is limited, the government must demonstrate "that the restriction is 'de-
monstrably justified' in a 'free and democratic society'-that is, a society
based on the recognition of fundamental rights, including tolerance of
expression which does not conform to the views of the majority."20
In the criminal realm, the government's burden is perhaps lighter be-
cause the proposed purpose of all criminal legislation is the protection of
public security and the preservation of society. 21 This objective may
dwarf any civil rights asserted by individuals. When assessing the legisla-
tive purpose, courts must look not to the potential consequences of the
legislated act, but rather to the facial purpose behind the legislation by
which Parliament aims to achieve its ends. 22 In R. v. Keegstra, which ad-
dressed hate crime legislation in a racial context, the Supreme Court re-
quired that the government show that the legislation focused on an
identified, pressing social problem. 23 "In the absence of an objective of
sufficient importance to justify overriding the right of free expression, the
state's interest in suppressing expression which may potentially affect a
public interest cannot outweigh the individual's constitutional right of
freedom of expression. '24
The freedoms of religion and expression receive qualified protection in
Charter section 2(b). Religious freedoms encompass "the right to enter-
tain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare relig-
ious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right
to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and
dissemination. '25 Both freedoms may be limited "to protect public
safety, order, health or morals and the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others."'26 In determining whether a governmental action is a reasona-
ble limitation on a freedom, the court balances the state's true justifica-
tion for infringement against the nature of the infringed-upon right. 27
17. Attis v. New Brunswick Dist. No. 15 Bd. of Educ., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 880.
18. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 732.
19. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 765-66.
20. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 760.
21. Id. at 762.
22. Id. at 760.
23. 3 S.C.R. at 725.
24. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 767.
25. Attis v. New Brunswick Dist. No. 15 Bd. of Educ., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 868 (quot-
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III. HATE CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAW GENERALLY
The purpose of hate crime legislation is to ensure an end to discrimina-
tion so that all citizens may enjoy equal participation in society.28 Ac-
cording to one court,
Discrimination ... may be taken to mean any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference which is founded on any aspect of the person
mentioned [in the hate crime legislation]... and which in purpose or ef-
fect impairs the enjoyment of persons of their rights, secured by these
sections [of the hate crime legislation], to equal opportunities.2 9
While a discriminatory act alone is not subject to criminal penalties,
discrimination motivated by hate will face criminal prosecution.30 Cana-
dian courts have defined hate as "extreme ill-will and an emotion which
allows for no redeeming qualities in the persons to whom it is directed;
and unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and
vilification."' 3 1 Sections 318 and 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code ad-
dress Offenses Against the Person and Reputation Hate Propaganda, de-
signed to protect minority groups who suffer societal repercussions when
fellow citizens are permitted to express ideas perceived as distasteful by
members of these groups.32 People are protected based on their color,
race, religion, ethnic origins,33 and since 2004, sexual orientation. 34 Al-
though hate speech legislation restricts a speaker's constitutional freedom
of expression, Canadian courts consider the criminalization of such
speech a reasonable limitation of section 2(b) rights because hate speech
has been determined to undermine the democratic process and deny re-
spect to individuals simply because they possess a certain characteristic.
35
For an act to qualify as criminal under section 319(2), the government
must show that the restriction on free speech is reasonable under Charter
section 1.36 If the language facing prohibition undermines democratic
values by "denying respect and dignity to certain members of society," 37 a
limitation on free expression is constitutionally permissible.35
28. Id. (citing Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 765).
29. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Bell, [1994] 21 C.R.R. (2d) 92, 17
(Sask. App. Ct.).
30. Hellquist v. Owens, [2002] 228 SASK. R. 148, 21 (Sask. Q.B.).
31. Bell, 21 C.R.R. (2d) at 21 (quoting Canada v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 928).
32. See Offenses Against the Person and Reputation Hate Propaganda, R.S.C. ch. C-46,
§§ 318, 319 (1985) (Can.).
33. Id.
34. Frank Stirk, Proposed Law Threatens Bible: A Bill Before Parliament Could Target
Certain Scripture Passages as "Hate Propaganda," CHRISTIAN WK., Aug. 20, 2002,
available at www.chriatianweek.orgfstories/voll6/noll/storyl.html.
35. Attis v. New Brunswick Dist. No. 15 Bd. of Educ., [19961 1 S.C.R. 825, 877.
36. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 733.
37. id.
38. Id.
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IV. CONCERNS ARISING FROM SECTION 318(4)
Hate speech issues ordinarily involve only the freedom of expression
provision of Charter section 2(b). The Legislation, however, impacts
both freedom of expression and freedom of religion.39 Section 318(4)
raises three primary concerns. First, some Christian groups fear that the
additional language infringes upon the freedom to express their religious
beliefs. 40 In particular, Christian groups are concerned that the Bible,
which they assert clearly stands against homosexual conduct, could be
considered hate speech and subsequently banned or censored.4 1 Sec-
ondly, adding sexual orientation to the list of protected classes may effec-
tively "clos[e] down... full debate on the homosexual issue."' 42 Finally,
opponents consider the Legislation loosely drafted; by failing to define
sexual orientation,43 it fails to identify who the Legislation is designed to
protect.44
A. FREEDOM OF RELIGION CONCERNS
Christians, the most vocal opponents of the legislation, seek to protect
Biblical passages that condemn homosexual practices. 45 Christians are
concerned that any vocalized religious opposition to homosexual behav-
ior will be considered hate speech subject to criminal prosecution.46 Re-
ligious groups believe that the law may allow censorship of Biblical
passages that condemn homosexual behaviors and that those quoting
such passages could be prosecuted. 47
To illustrate their concerns, opponents reference two instances in which
hate speech protection for sexual orientation has or might have led to
prosecution. First, in 1997, Sylvia MacEachern, editor of the Roman
Catholic Journal, was subjected to a hate crime investigation following an
interview on an Ottawa radio station, during which MacEachern affirmed
the Catholic Church's position that homosexual acts are contrary to na-
ture and depraved. 48 Following the interview, the hate crimes unit of the
39. There are also a number of issues involving freedom of the press and media, par-
ticularly arising out of the Hugh Owens case. These, however, are not addressed in
this paper.
40. Toews, supra note 5; see also Graham A.D. Scott, Homosexuality: Why Bill C-415
(Now Bill C-250) is Ill-Advised, CHURCH ALIVE CANADA, Nov. 4, 2002, available
at www.churchalivecanada.org/theology/homosexuality-scott.html.
41. Stirk, supra note 34.
42. Id.
43. Canada Bill C-250, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda), 2nd
Sess., 37th ParI., 2002 (first reading).
44. Scott, supra note 40.
45. Toews, supra note 5.
46. Id.
47. See Scott, supra note 40; see also Stirk, supra note 34; Pending Law Source of
Concern, GUELPH MERCURY, Dec. 6, 2002, at A5, available at 2002 WL 103208708.
48. Rory Leishman, Bill C-250 Poses Threat to Conscientious Christians, LONDON
FREE PRESS, June 1, 2003, available at http://www.familyaction.org/Articles/issues/
bill-C415/leishman-junel.htm.
2004]
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Ottawa-Carleton Police investigated MacEachern and her statements. 49
Because sexual orientation was not a protected classification under the
hate speech laws, prosecution was not possible.50 Section 318(4) now al-
lows the government to prosecute a similar case and citizens like
MacEachern could face criminal prosecution for confirming their faith's
doctrinal beliefs.5 '
In a more recent case, Hugh Owens placed an anti-homosexual adver-
tisement in a secular newspaper. 52 Incorporating quotations from the
Biblical books Leviticus, Romans, and I Corinthians, Owens's advertise-
ment also included an encircled picture of two males holding hands with a
red line through the circle.5 3 The advertisement offered bumper stickers
with the same image for sale.5 4 Three homosexual men filed a complaint
against Owens pursuant to the Saskatchewan criminal provision against
hate speech, Human Rights Code S-24.1, section 14,55 not pursuant to
Canada's Federal Criminal Code.56 The Saskatchewan provision, how-
ever, uses language similar to Section 318(4). 57 The complaint claimed
that the red circle with a slash was intended to make homosexual people
feel inferior.5 8 After the Board of Inquiry determined that the "adver-
tisement exposed gay persons to hatred and ridicule, and affronted [the]
dignity of gay persons," 59 the Board found that banning the advertise-
ment was a "reasonable restriction on [Owens'] freedom of speech. '60
The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission subsequently convicted
Owens for discrimination against homosexuals and ordered him, as well
as the newspaper that published the advertisement, to pay $1,500 to three
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Stirk, supra note 34.
52. Hellquist v. Owens, [2002] 228 SASK. R. 148, 2 (Sask. Q.B.).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Prohibitions Against Publications. S.S. ch. S-24.1, § 14 (1979) (Can.), states:
(1) No person shall publish or display, or cause or permit to be published or
displayed, on any lands or premises or in a newspaper, though a television or
radio broadcasting station or any other broadcasting device, or in any printed
matter or publication or by means of any other medium that the person
owns, controls, distributes or sells, any representation, including any notice,
sign, symbol, emblem, article, statement or other representation:
(a) tending or likely to tend to deprive, abridge or otherwise restrict the
enjoyment by any person or class of persons, on the basis of a prohibited
ground, of any right to which that person or class of persons is entitled
under law; or
(b) that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or oth-
erwise affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons [or a group
of persons; because of his or their race, creed, religion, colour, sex, sexual
orientation, family status, marital status, disability, age, nationality, an-
cestry, place of origin or receipt or public assistance].
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) restricts the right to freedom of speech under
the law upon any subject.
56. Owens, 228 Sask. R. at 2.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., id. at 4.
59. Id. at 1.
60. Id.
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homosexual activists.61 On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's
Bench affirmed the Board's decision that Owens' right to freedom of
speech was not unreasonably violated. 62
In the Owens case, the Canadian Supreme Court did not discuss the
constitutionality of Saskatchewan Human Rights Code section 14. In a
previous case addressing an offense similar to Owens's, the Court deter-
mined that while section 14 clearly contravenes Charter section 2(b), such
a violation is reasonable under Charter section 1.63 In its analysis, the
Canadian Supreme Court found that the objective of the Saskatchewan
Human Rights Code is to insure equality for all human dignity so that
every person is treated equally so as to eliminate discrimination. 64 Sec-
tion 14(1) "is quite clearly directed at discouraging, if not eliminating,
activity which reinforces prejudice and in turn fosters discrimination. '65
Because section 14's constitutionality was previously established, the only
determination in Owens's case focused on whether he violated section 14.
Owens's advertisement violated section 14's objective because the adver-
tisement purposefully caused one group to feel inferior; they were "likely
to cause others to engage in one or more of the discriminatory prac-
tices" 66 prohibited by the Code; and they would likely "expos[e] homo-
sexuals to hatred or ridicule."' 67 Owens and MacEarchern's cases
illustrate why Christians fear potential legal problems that may arise from
quoting and expressing religious sources.
B. TERMINATION OF PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY
Because the Legislation makes sexual orientation a protected class,
some groups, including Christians and others, predict that such protection
may effectively terminate all open debate about homosexuality or its
place in society. 68 Any opinion not supportive of alternative sexual ori-
entations could be viewed as critical, and thus, as an expression of hatred.
Gwen Landolt, national vice-president of REAL Women, 69 says that the
Legislation could impact the entire public because it prohibits anyone
from speaking hatefully about an identifiable group.70 Therefore, anyone
speaking out against homosexuality may face criminal charges. 71 Within
the past year, Canadians have engaged in extensive discussions relating to
sexual orientation in the context of legalization of marriages between
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Bell, [1994] 21 C.R.R. (2d) 92, 30
(Sask. App. Ct.).
64. Owens, 228 SASK. R. at 12-14.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 14.
68. MERCURY, supra note 47, at A5.
69. REAL Women is a pro-life, pro-family, Canadian advocacy group, available at
http://www.realwomenca.com.
70. MERCURY, supra note 47, at A5.
71. Id.
2004]
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same sex couples. Some citizens worry that debates over issues such as
homosexual marriages may now be classified as criminal offenses by
those who do not support the practice. 72 Political discussions about sex-
ual orientation and the associated homosexual rights might cease due to
fears of criminal prosecution.73
C. FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY DEFINE SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The Legislation, judicial decisions, and other case law fail to define the
term sexual orientation.74 Concerns have arisen over the fact that no one
knows which groups and practices the Legislation protects from hate
speech. Church Alive Canada, a theological publication produced by the
United Church of Canada, reports "that an Ontario Member of Parlia-
ment has stated that sexual orientation includes all forms of sexual behav-
ior: sodomy, bestiality, pedophilia, homosexuality, bi-sexuality, trans-
sexuality, polygamy and even sado-masochism. '' 75 Questions then arise
as to whether such a broad, inclusive definition could lead to the legaliza-
tion of pedophilia or bestiality. That definition could also end public op-
position to these and similar practices. When a term such as sexual
orientation remains undefined, citizens who vocally and publicly oppose
polygamy or pedophilia do so without knowing whether they will be pros-
ecuted for their statements. Similarly, citizens who engage in such sexual
practices do not know whether the government will protect their sexual
practices from negative statements.
Some members of the judiciary have expressed concern when a crimi-
nal provision includes undefined terms. The justice writing for the major-
ity of the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Zundel, a 1992 case
addressing whether laws against spreading false information violated
freedom of expression, wrote, "I do not assert that Parliament cannot
criminalize . . . hate propaganda. I do assert, however, that such provi-
sions must be drafted with sufficient particularity to offer assurance that
they cannot be abused so as to stifle a broad range of legitimate and valu-
able speech. ''76 Some members of the judiciary remain unconcerned that
criminal provisions may include undefined terms.77 In a case considering
whether an author violated a statute against spreading false news that was
intended to protect the public, a concurring justice wrote that the failure
to define the term public interest did not cause the legislation to be un-
duly vague.78 Instead, he emphasized that numerous terms in the crimi-
nal code, such as obscene, indecent, immoral, and scurrilous remain
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Stirk, supra note 34.
75. Scott, supra note 40.
76. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 743.
77. Id. at 805.
78. Id.
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undefined 79 and that several others lack sufficient definitions.80 Failure
to adequately define terms, he argued, is an insufficient reason for a court
to find a criminal provision unduly broad, and thus, unconstitutional.8'
D. THE LEGISLATION'S SAFEGUARDS
Although some Christians oppose section 318(4) because it could result
in a limitation of free expression and religion, the supporters of the Legis-
lation maintain that religious speech will remain protected and that the
Bible will not be censored.82 The Legislation's supporters rely on Crimi-
nal Code section 319(3), which states that "[n]o person shall be convicted
of an offence . . . if, in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish
by argument opinion upon a religious subject."'83 The MacEachern and
Owens cases indicate otherwise. Both MacEachern and Owens stated
their concerns about homosexuality stemming from their Christian foun-
dations. While neither faced legal challenges arising strictly from quoting
Biblical passages, both made religious objections and faced penalties as a
result.
A second asserted safeguard is that strict procedural devices will limit
hate crime prosecutions.84 Before commencing a hate crime action, an
Attorney General (AG) must grant permission to prosecute the proposed
defendant.85 The AG's permission, however, must be given only if the
prosecution occurs under section 318, the genocide provision, or section
319(2), prosecution for wilful promotion of hatred. 86 The exclusion of
Criminal Code section 319(1), which provides for prosecution for public
incitement of hatred, leaves a gap in the Legislation.8 7
Assuming that requiring the AG's permission to prosecute provides
sufficient protection for most hate speech cases, this safeguard is under-
cut in the context of section 318(4) by claims that many AGs support
homosexual activists and are likely to give permission to prosecute
freely. 88 As evidence of such support, critics point to events in Ontario
and Alberta. In Ontario, the Attorney General supported a definition of
marriage that encompassed same-sex couples over the common law defi-
nition that included only heterosexuals. 89 The same AG permitted his
department to drop pending nudity charges against a Gay Pride parade's




82. Leishman, supra note 48.
83. Offenses Against the Person and Reputation Hate Propaganda, R.S.C. ch. C-46,
§ 319(3) (1985) (Can.).
84. Leishman, supra note 48.
85. Id.
86. See Offenses Against the Person and Reputation Hate Propaganda, §§ 318, 319.
87. Toews, supra note 5.
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AG declined to challenge a lesbian couple seeking to adopt a baby.91
However, the critics' most compelling argument that prosecutorial discre-
tion is an insufficient safeguard is the fact that multiple AGs supported
the movement to make sexual orientation a protected class, which ap-
pears to indicate a predisposition to prosecute those suspected of speak-
ing out against homosexuality. 92
V. CONCLUSION: THE JUDICIARY's RESPONSE
TO SECTION 318(4)
Pursuant to the Court's analysis of Charter section 2, a restriction on
what citizens may express about homosexuality is clearly a restriction on
their freedom of expression. The application of section 318(4) will dictate
whether it unconstitutionally limits Canadian citizens' freedom of expres-
sion and religion rights under Charter section 2. If challenged, a court
would be forced to determine whether such an infringement is reasonable
in light of governmental interests.
Even though the Canadian Supreme Court recognizes its infringement
on constitutional freedoms, the Court has allowed, fairly leniently, the
expansion of hate speech legislation. The Court appears to support the
government's goal of protecting societal minorities from negative ideas.
It seems improbable then that the Court would find the inclusion of sex-
ual orientation as an identifiable group to be an unreasonable extension
of existing hate speech legislation. If the government's purpose in adopt-
ing the Legislation is to increase homosexuals' acceptance in Canadian
society, outlawing anti-homosexual comments is rationally related to that
goal. The sexual orientation addition, however, could struggle to over-
come the second component of the rationality test. A strong argument
can be made, particularly by religious groups, that the Legislation in-
fringes on their freedoms more than is necessary in order to accomplish
its purpose. If adding sexual orientation limits the use of Biblical
passages and political debate, perhaps Parliament may have adopted
overly invasive measures to accomplish its goal. Finally, the proportion-
ality test between the government's objective and the measure's effects
on civil freedoms may not be in the proper balance if, again, the Legisla-
tion limits religious rights and shuts down political debate on an issue of
central importance to the nation. The last two aspects of the reasonable-
ness test are not necessarily roadblocks that would cause the Court to
find section 318(4) unconstitutional. If the governmental interests were
extremely strong and Parliament closely tailored its means, the term iden-
tifiable group could be constitutionally expanded.
Some members of Canada's Supreme Court have indicated, however,
that they may not support additions to hate speech legislation. 93 In R. v.
Zundel, the majority wrote:
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, 743.
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To permit imprisonment of people, or even the threat of imprison-
ment, on the ground that they have made a statement which 12 of
their co-citizens deem to be false and mischievous to some undefined
public interest, is to stifle a whole range of speech, some of which has
long been regarded as legitimate and even beneficial to our society.
I do not assert that Parliament cannot criminalize the dissemination
of racial slurs and hate propaganda. I do assert, however, that such
provisions must be drafted with sufficient particularity to offer assur-
ance that they cannot be abused so as to stifle a broad range of legiti-
mate and valuable speech.9 4
As the Canadian Parliament only recently adopted the Legislation, un-
certainty remains regarding its enforcement. If Biblical quotations and
other religious language are limited because they are deemed criminal in
nature, a constitutional challenge is to be expected. The challenge could
be premised on an unconstitutional limitation of freedom of expression,
religion, or media rights to an extent beyond what is reasonable under
Charter section 1. Thus far, it appears that the Canadian Supreme Court
is unlikely to find the Legislation, as written, unconstitutional. Still, the
majority's opinion in R. v. Zundel indicates that the Court may be in-
clined to change the identifiable groups protected under national hate
speech legislation. The Court appears concerned that citizens could be
imprisoned for making statements that are illegal under a broad, vague
law that acts to limit constitutional rights. The Court's interest in protect-
ing all constitutional rights provides religious groups with hope that they
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